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Abstract
Background: In resource-limited settings where laboratory capacity is limited and response strategy is non-specific,
delayed or inappropriate intervention against outbreaks of Norovirus (NoV) are common. Here we report interventions
of two norovirus outbreaks, which highlight the importance of evidence-based modeling and assessment to identify
infection sources and formulate effective response strategies.
Methods: Spatiotemporal scanning, mathematical and random walk modeling predicted the modes of transmission in
the two incidents, which were supported by laboratory results and intervention outcomes.
Results: Simulation results indicated that contaminated water was 14 to 500 fold more infectious than infected
individuals. Asymptomatic individuals were not effective transmitters. School closure for up to a week still could
not contain the outbreak unless the duration was extended to 10 or more days. The total attack rates (TARs) for
waterborne NoV outbreaks reported in China (n = 3, median = 4.37) were significantly (p < 0.05) lower than worldwide
(n = 14, median = 41.34). The low TARs are likely due to the high number of the affected population.
Conclusions: We found that school closure alone could not contain Norovirus outbreaks. Overlooked personal
hygiene may serve as a hotbed for infectious disease transmission. Our results reveal that evidence-based
investigations can facilitate timely interventions of Norovirus transmission.
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Background
Neither specific treatment nor vaccination is available to
norovirus illness. Despite a highly contagious virus that
causes gastroenteritis worldwide, the monitoring of NoV
is elusive. In the United States, NoV was responsible for
annual incidence of 21 million [1], 71,000 hospitaliza-
tions [2] and 800 deaths [1, 3]. In developing countries,
NoV outbreak reports are limited and NoV was found to
be responsible for diarrheal disease in The Gambia [4].
The paradoxical higher prevalence of NoV in controls
than in cases [4] was suggested as a result of reinfection
by mathematical modeling [5]. Although the capacity of
norovirus nucleic acid detection is becoming available in
China, the understandings towards this pathogen remain
accumulating, more formal reports of NoV outbreaks
are needed [6–8]. Waterborne NoV outbreaks were re-
ported worldwide and some of the reported outbreaks
since 2000 are summarized in Additional file 1: Table S1.
Most of the outbreaks were related to potable water con-
tamination. Dubbed winter vomiting bug, waterborne
NoV outbreaks indeed appeared to occur all year round.
Even for developed countries, mathematical modeling
studies of NoV are limited. Neither estimates of the basic
reproduction number R0 nor other relevant parameters
were estimated for developing countries [5]. An estimate
of R0 = 3.74 was obtained by fitting a compartmental
transmission model to a NoV outbreak data involving 39
individuals in Belgium [9].
An uncontained outbreak could have severe economic
consequences [10]. Ward closure to control nosocomial
NoV outbreak was also not advocated, concerning
bed-days and revenue loss [11–13]. Campus NoV out-
break was also reported in California, Michigan and
Wisconsin in 2008, widespread infection and rapid
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transmission prompted closure of the Michigan campus
[14]. School closure is a common method to contain NoV
transmission in China. However, the effectiveness is un-
known. Furthermore, despite China's improvement in
water, sanitation and hygiene, more than 320 million
people still lacked access to sanitized water [15]. The vul-
nerability is to be explored.
Although the factors of incubation period, latent
period, infectious period, the proportion of latent infec-
tion for NoV were investigated [16–25], the correspond-
ing factors of NoV transmission in the community,
schools and via water and the contribution of asymptom-
atic individuals to the transmission have not been eluci-
dated. In China, there is a lack of quantitative assessment
of the effectiveness of interventions such as isolation,
water disinfection and school closure. The aforemen-
tioned factors and effectiveness of countermeasures are
difficult to characterize by conventional epidemiological
methods. Mathematical modeling and simulation can
complement the analysis [26, 27]. Here we report two out-
breaks in a China metropolis, Changsha City, and com-
pared the outbreak reports with those of the worldwide.
Basing on the natural history of diarrhea due to NoV in-
fection, we built an ordinary differential equation (ODE)
model to characterize the NoV interpersonal and water-
borne transmission dynamics and the effectiveness of
intervention in schools and communities.
Methods
The study and investigation were in response to an acute
public health emergency event, and no personal identifi-
able information was include. Ten to fifty percent of the
total population at risk were used for space-time scanning
by SaTScan™ v9.4.2 (July 2015, Boston and Information
Management Services Inc., Calverton Maryland). The sig-
nificance of mode of transmission was estimated by per-
mutation tests on the basis of Monte Carlo simulations
[28]. Random walk was used to sample the probability dis-
tribution of interpersonal transmission [29]. Two states
“interpersonal” and “non-interpersonal” were modeled. In
the first incident, random walk modeling was used to as-
sess the proportion between interpersonal and waterborne
transmissions. In the second incident, the visit frequency
to the potential source of infection was estimated.
A Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious/asymptomatic-Re-
moved-Water (SEIARW) model, similar to the one mod-
eling shigellosis outbreak [26], was used to characterize
NoV transmission epidemics. Berkeley Madonna 8.3.18
(developed by Robert Macey and George Oster of the
University of California at Berkeley. Copyright ©1993-
2001 Robert I. Macey & George F. Oster) was employed
for model simulation. The Runge-Kutta method of order
4 with the tolerance set at 0.001 was used to perform
curve fitting on prevalence [30]. Sensitivity analysis was
tested by varying parameters into 1000 values ranging
from the minimum to maximum of the reported values
in literature (Additional file 2: Table S2).
Results
Incident 1
On December 7, 2014, continual vomiting and diarrhea
cases were reported in different locations of a village in
Changsha. For the field outbreak investigation, some
case definitions were defined as follows: a), probable
case was defined as vomiting or diarrhea (>3 times/day)
in the village population since November 25, 2014, add-
itional symptoms included nausea, fever, chill, abdominal
pain, abdominal distension, headache and dizziness; b)
confirmed case was defined as probable case plus posi-
tive of Norovirus from the feces or vomitus samples; c)
asymptomatic was defined as positive fo Norovirus but
without any symptoms (in this outbreak, asymptomatic
infection was not investigated by local CDC but simu-
lated by the SEIARW model). Some residents in the af-
fected community had manifested symptoms such as
vomiting or diarrhea (>3 times/day), fever, headache and
dizziness since November 28. Since the index case dated
November 28, the number of cases increased and
remained high with fluctuation from December 3 until it
flatten off on December 7. Demographic and clinical
characteristics of the cases manifested symptoms of
gastroenteritis (Additional file 3: Table S3). Preliminary
epidemiologic field investigations identified the village
had its own deep wells (depth 280 m) and no other
water sources were nearby. Three pumping stations de-
livered water to the neighborhood for drinking and
household use but the extracted groundwater was not
disinfected. In spite of sampling from various sources
such as rectal swabs, water from different locations, both
laboratory test and field investigation took time and
therefore isolation was implemented first.
The period between November 28 and December 7 was
regarded as a non-intervention period. The SEIARW
model was used to estimate the interpersonal transmissi-
bility b, the water-to-person transmissibility bW, the
transmissibility ratio of asymptomatic-to-symptomatic
individuals k, the asymptomatic individual viral shed-
ding coefficient c, and the basic reproduction number
R0. There were 643 residents in the village. At the be-
ginning there was one case, therefore s0 = 0.998, e0 = 0, i0
= 0.002, a0 = 0, r0 = 0, w0 = 0 (Please see Additional file 4
for more details) respectively. If there is excreted virus
within water, then the water body becomes infectious.
Since w(t) is a constant, sensitivity test showed that w(t) =
1 is the best fit. The following parameters were estimated
accordingly: b = 0.8230, bW =0.01470, k = 4.1539 × 10
-11, c
=0.182201, R0 = 1.94 and R0W = 4.91 (Additional file 5:
Figure S1). Therefore, asymptomatic individuals were not
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prioritized as the targets of analysis and infection control.
Infection control team expanded the field investigation in
order to evaluate the sources of infection on the 8th
December.
The team focused on water contamination and drew a
map showing the spatiotemporal information of 90 re-
ported cases and the water distribution network (Fig. 1).
Space-time permutation scan did not reveal disease clus-
ters. Integrating the information available from the
depth of well (280 m) and the spatiotemporal distribu-
tion of the cases, design and maintenance of water ser-
vice and building sewer, contamination of water pipes
but not the well or pumping stations was likely. Field
epidemiological survey showed that water pipes were all
iron and were used more than decades of years, and
some of which were buried under land, some of them
were closed to surface drain or sewage pool, which
might increase the probability of the contamination al-
though local CDC did not find the contaminated spot.
We could strongly infer that some spot of the pipe was
rusty and contaminated, and then the contaminated
water would go through widely when the pump worked
and make a suck-back. More information about the
water distribution network and storage devices was in-
cluded in the Additional file 6.
On the 9th of December laboratory results were avail-
able. Rectal swab results were negative for Vibrio cholerae
O1 or O139, Vibrio cholerae, Escherichia coli, Proteusba-
cillus vulgaris, Salmonella and Shigella species and other
common diarrheal pathogens (Rotavirus, Adenovirus,
Astrovirus and Sappovirus), but positive for NoV GII.
Total coliforms, thermotolerant coliforms, and colony
count for bacteria all exceeded critical values in tap water
samples. NoV GII was again tested positive. Solid form of
chlorine was then put into water towers of pumping sta-
tions. The epidemic began to decline after disinfection
and on the 13th of December no more new cases were
identified. The epidemic curve (Fig. 2) indicates a pattern
of mixed epidemic. There were a total of 159 cases, affect-
ing about 643 residents. The total attack rate was 24.73 %
and the outbreak lasted for 13 days.
The isolation measures taken during December 7-8
had not alleviated the epidemic. We therefore conducted
a retrospective analysis of SEIARW modeling, employing
the full-course data of the outbreak to assess the effect-
iveness of isolation, water disinfection and the combined
approach. Simulation results showed that isolation alone
still results in a TAR of 69.99 % (95 % CI, 69.34-70.64),
comparable to the situation of no intervention. Water
disinfection isolation alone did better, but still unable to
contain the outbreak (TAR dropped to 53.89 % (95 % CI,
53.32-54.46)). The TAR and the duration of outbreak
(DO) of combined measure were most consistent with
the observed data (25.32 vs 24.73 and 23 vs 23, respect-
ively). More details of the simulation results are shown
in Table 1. Among 22 affected apartments, there were
19 flats each with two reported cases happening on the
same or next day. Monte Carlo permutation test result
Fig. 1 Spatiotemporal information of reported cases and the water distribution network of the village outbreak
Chen et al. BMC Public Health  (2016) 16:1072 Page 3 of 9
(Fig. 3a) suggests that this was unlikely to happen by
chance (p = 0.01), which supports the contribution of
interpersonal in addition to water-to-person transmis-
sion. Random walk results suggest that interpersonal
transmission contributed to about 20 percent of all
cases (Fig. 3b-d).
Simulated results of the best execution time of
different interventions revealed that the earlier the com-
bined intervention were simulated the better the effect-
iveness of the strategy would concluded. Although
isolation implemented at different execution time had
the same TAR, the earlier the intervention was con-
ducted the lower number of peak cases and the longer
DO of the outbreak. The similar results were observed
on water disinfection, what the difference was that the
TAR was low down to 51.18 %. However, when isolation
and water disinfection were combined, the earlier the in-
terventions were conducted the lower TAR and number
of peak cases, the shorter DO of the outbreak and the
earlier the peak day (Additional file 7: Table S4).
Incident 2
On December 24, 2014, a local branch Center for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention in Changsha received a
telephone report about frequent cases of vomiting, diar-
rhea in a high school. The school had 25 classes of three
grades and a total of 1,400 students and 153 teaching
and supporting staff. Our infection control team under-
went field epidemiological investigation according to the
same case definition as incident 1. the school had its five
deep wells each about 50 meters deep, with pressure
pumps delivering water to school buildings, dormitories
and canteen for domestic water use. Water for drinking
was first purified before delivering to drinking bottles.
There was a single canteen, which serves all students
and staff (Fig. 4). Water samples from each well and taps
of teaching complex and anal swabs of canteen staff
were collected and subjected to laboratory testing. Nega-
tive results were obtained. The vomit and stool speci-
mens from only one case were detected with the
presence of GII NoV. Along with these lines of evidence
Fig. 2 Distribution of cases by date of illness onset. a the school outbreak. b the village outbreak
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and no staff was infected, neither food poisoning nor
water transmission was likely. Monte Carlo permutation
result also supports interpersonal transmission (Fig. 3e).
Believing interpersonal transmission as the main route,
we enforced isolation, supplemented by environmental
cleaning and disinfection, education on hand hygiene
and avoidance of drinking unboiled water, establishment
of daily screening and sickness absence recording sys-
tem. Indeed after intervention there were no new cases.
There were a total of 30 cases, leading to a TAR of
2.14 % and DO of 16 days. The epidemic curve indicates
a growth pattern (Fig. 2). Results of model fitting reveals
that b = 1.6344, k = 3.7301 × 10-9, R0 = 3.44. Mathematical
modeling was performed to assess the effect of control
measures. Isolation and school closure are two common
interventions of intramural interpersonal transmission in
China. Either isolation or 10-day class suspension (or
both) could bring down the TAR and DO to 2.26 % and
15 days respectively. School closure for 7, 8 and 9 days
since December 24 were not predicted to be able to con-
tain an outbreak (Please see Additional file 8 for more
details), yielding a similar result to that of no inter-
vention (Table 1), with TAR over 67 % and DO more
than 39 days. Only 11 out of 25 classes were affected
in this incident, and the cases appeared to be spor-
adic (Additional file 9: Table S5). Since no definitive
source was identified, we used random walk to assess
the visit frequency of the potential source of infec-
tion. We modeled the visit frequency within a specific
period as a key factor to get contacts with a contami-
nated source, assuming that the probability of being
infected could be relevant to the visit frequency. The
simulation results did suggest that the source had to
be a rather frequently visited location in order to re-
generate the observed epidemic (Fig. 3f-h).
Until now, we have introduced two reported water-
borne NoV outbreaks in China and we compared them
with other 14 outbreaks worldwide in terms of the actual
TARs (Additional file 1: Table S1). The median TAR in
China was 4.37, compared with 41.34 worldwide. The
difference was significant (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05).
There was however no significant difference between
China and the other countries in terms of the duration
between the time of onset of the index case and the time
when the outbreak was reported (p = 0.92).
Simulated results revealed that the earlier isolation
was simulated the better the effectiveness of the strategy
would be concluded. However, school closure would not
have the good results even when it was implemented
earlier to day 3 (Additional file 7: Table S4).
Discussions
To our knowledge, this is the first study to characterize
the transmission dynamics and control of a waterborne
NoV outbreak. Our data also enhances our understand-
ing towards the NoV outbreak situation in China.
Inefficient transmission of asymptomatic individuals
reconciles the finding of the paradoxical higher preva-
lence of NoV in controls than in cases of the recent
Global Enteric Multicenter Study [4]. Our data also
enrich the dataset of waterborne NoV outbreaks in
China. School closure was not predicted to be an ef-
fective control. Identification of target affected population
is as important as locating infection source and mode of
transmission in order to take prompt countermeasures. In
resource-limited setting, a balance between hazards and
benefits calls for action to enforce sanitation and
water disinfection; and promote personal hygiene to
proactively prevent and contain NoV and other water-
borne disease outbreaks.
Contaminated water was 14- to 500-fold more infec-
tious than transmission associated with person-to-person
contact. Usually water is far less effective in the transmis-
sion of NoV. Despite a much lower transmissibility by
water (bW =0.01) than by the infected in a local commu-
nity (b = 0.82) or a school (b = 1.63), the spread of NoV by
water was still the most rapid (R0 = 4.91), versus R0 = 1.94
Table 1 Comparison between reported data and simulated
results by different interventions implemented in two outbreaks
in Changsha, 2014
Intervention TARa (%) Cumulative
cases
DOc
(day)% 95 % CIb
Outbreak 1
Reported data 24.73 24.35-25.11 159 23
Isolation 69.99 69.34-70.64 450 190
Water disinfection 53.89 53.32-54.46 346 43
Isolation +Water disinfection 24.93 24.54-25.32 160 23
None 70.00 69.35-70.65 450 103
Outbreak 2
Reported data 2.14 2.06-2.22 30 16
Isolation 2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
School closure (7 days) 67.23 66.80-67.66 941 50
School closure (8 days) 67.22 66.79-67.65 941 52
School closure (9 days) 67.21 66.78-67.64 941 54
School closure (10 days) 2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
Isolation + School closure
(7 days)
2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
Isolation + School closure
(8 days)
2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
Isolation + School closure
(9 days)
2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
Isolation + School closure
(10 days)
2.26 2.18-2.34 32 15
None 67.45 67.02-67.88 944 39
aTotal attack rate; bconfidence interval; cduration of outbreak
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in community and R0 = 3.44 in school. A previous math-
ematical modeling study of NoV suggested that asymp-
tomatic prevalence could be varying [5], however, our
results predicted that contribution of asymptomatic in-
dividuals to the spread of NoV was minimal, with low
interpersonal transmissibility coefficients k = 3.73 × 10-9
and k = 4.15 × 10-11 under the school and the commu-
nity settings respectively. Their shedding capability was
also only about 18 % of the symptomatic individuals.
Latent infection devoid of gastroenteritis symptoms
such as vomiting and/or watery diarrhea may have signifi-
cantly lowered the transmissibility. Even if they do shed
Fig. 3 Permutation test results by random walk modeling for incidents 1 (a-d) and 2 (e-h). a The observed number of 19 cases in incident 1 was
unlikely to be due to pure waterborne infections. b-d Simulated number of cases by different probability of interpersonal transmission from 1000
experiments. e The observed number of 12 cases in incident 2 was unlikely to be due to random infections. f-h Simulated number of cases by
different relative visit frequency intensity from 1000 experiments
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NoV, the titer is lower [23–25]. Therefore, our results sug-
gest a possible alternative explanation for the paradoxical
higher prevalence of NoV in controls than in cases of the
recent Global Enteric Multicenter Study [4].
Water-to-person transmission was predicted to be the
fastest, followed by interpersonal transmission in school,
and then interpersonal transmission in the community.
Wide coverage of water supply, daily contact and low in-
fectious dose [31] render water an effective vector for
NoV infection. In turn, population density and contact
frequency are both higher in schools than in community,
which accounts for higher interpersonal transmissibility
in the former.
In the NoV outbreak due to drinking water source
contamination, isolation alone did not contain the out-
break; TAR was predicted to be about the same, but with
a longer DO. Similarly, water disinfection alone could
only reduce TAR and DO to about 23 % and 58 % re-
spectively. Only a combined measure of both could
bring down the TAR and DO from 70.00 % (no interven-
tion) to 24.93 % and 154 (no intervention) to 23 days.
The actual NoV outbreak TARs reported in China was
significantly lower than worldwide. Two reasons may be
responsible for this finding. Firstly, the number of the
affected population in China was reported significantly
larger than that worldwide (3915 versus 1845, P < 0.05)
while the number of infected population was not (294
versus 158, P = 0.96). If reported target populations were
non-specific, the reported TARs were indeed deflated.
Although the Chinese population is large and reports in
India and Russia were unavailable, the number of in-
fected was not correspondingly high. Secondly, many
worldwide reports of large TAR were specific incidences
in a focused area such as excursion or leisure activities
in resorts, hotels or small towns. High cost of viral moni-
toring outbreaks and control [32], insufficient public per-
ception and awareness of NoV, health-seeking motivation
and practices of gastroenteritis, immature information-
sharing, data collection and dissemination may hinder re-
ports from local schools, departments or other entities.
Experience accumulation, regular health structures and
expert epidemiologic support at local level are the first
steps towards a well-designed sentinel system for health
promotion and disease transmission blockage. In the sec-
ond incident of NoV outbreak, no positive results were
obtained from water samples and those collected from
food processing staff. Not a single one of the staff indeed
manifested symptoms of NoV infection. The relatively
high visit frequency obtained by random walk analysis
suggests that toilet might act as the hotbed for transmis-
sion. In certain areas of China, hand washing after toilet
visits before eating or preparing food is not deemed neces-
sary. Moreover, vomitus and stool in the toilet may not be
discarded properly due to the prevalence of dry toilets
[33]. In future, flushing and keeping the surrounding area
of toilets clean should be advocated. Personal hygiene
should also be emphasized.
A limitation of this study was that we analyzed data of
only two outbreaks, and that five parameters had to be
taken from the literature. Nevertheless, our mathematical
Fig. 4 Probable locations of infection of the school outbreak
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models reflect well the actual epidemic. Moreover, sensi-
tivity analysis confirms that our model was relatively in-
sensitive to the change in parameter. Finally, we also
characterized the transmissibility and viral shedding coef-
ficient during the asymptomatic phase of the disease. Fur-
ther field test and pathological investigation are warranted
for infection control of NoV.
Conclusions
We found that school closure alone could not contain
Norovirus outbreaks. Overlooked personal hygiene may
serve as a hotbed for infectious disease transmission.
Our results reveal that evidence-based investigations can
facilitate timely interventions of Norovirus transmission.
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